**Post-Anarchism and Social War**

*Post-Structuralism, and the Revival of an Anarchist Subterranean*

Dedicated to my friends kidnapped by the State on 15th October, 2007.

We are too young, we cannot wait any longer. – *Parisian Graffiti*

Anarchism remains a living political and cultural tradition which, though largely ignored in academia, has been radically transforming itself, engaging in extensive self-critique and reinventing its practice since its formal inception in the early 19th Century. First theorised by the likes of William Godwin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Mikhail Bakunin, anarchism developed simultaneously as an ‘organic’ orientation within the early socialist movements, only to be superseded by the Statist varieties – notably Marxism and social democracy – in the early 20th Century. Though eclipsed, anarchism as ‘socialism against the State’ became a more expansive project oriented against the totality of relations of domination, and was crucial in providing the inspiration for the liberatory ruptures across the world in 1968 before rising to prominence again in the ‘anti-globalisation’ movements at the turn of the 21st Century. Those within the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement focussed

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much of their energy on targeting and forcing the closure of meetings of the Group of Eight, the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank, being successful on a number of occasions – in spite of State violence – before the movement’s demise over the last five years (Graeber, 2007). The orientation of the movement, however, brought out critiques of ‘summit hopping’ and the more substantial critique of the ‘spectacle of resistance’, and has had the lingering effect so as to prompt a re-evaluation of the dynamics of power and domination, of resistance, and a return to the ever-present question ‘What is to be done?’. The aim here is to articulate one such vision – post-anarchism – drawing on post-structuralist conceptions of the social, and to explore the implications for resistance and social transformation.

Post-anarchism is an unfortunate name, and is used here only in accordance with recent convention. It is not, as the name implies, an attempt to render obsolete much of traditional anarchist theory, but rather an attempt to give life to a subterranean tradition that has always existed within, at times concealed but becoming clearly discernable more recently. While originally a contraction of post-structuralist anarchism, the theory is not simply the marriage of the two bodies of work, but is foremost a juxtaposition of the post-structuralist critique so as to draw out those moments within anarchist theory – already extant – with which it is consonant. Of course, neither anarchism nor post-structuralism are in any way coherent or systematic theories. It is precisely the lack of coherence and heterogeneity of the former that will provide the creativity for this essay, and in the latter it is the work of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze which will provide the necessary juxtaposition.

Of central concern is the conception of power and the strong humanism prevalent throughout classical anarchism. While critical of Marxism’s economic reductionism, classical anarchism has tended at times to commit the same error with regards to the State, locating in it the source of all social domination and understanding the State in a top-down fashion. Moreover, the apparatus of the State appears oftentimes as ontologically distinct from ‘the masses’, as a yoke upon people who would otherwise realise their natural tendencies towards cooperation and egalitarianism. In contrast, the work of Foucault and Deleuze understands power as distributed and rhizomatic, where localised practices and ‘micro-politics’ work to produce the relations of domination in ‘macro-politics’, and where we are already complicit in our own domination. Moreover, in their critiques of humanism they reject essentialist conceptions of human subjectivity and the ‘suppressive assumption’ of power, and instead understand power as productive, providing at least one answer as to why people would desire their own oppression. Employing these critiques we shall draw out from anarchist theory precisely those moments that articulate an anti-humanist conception of subjectivity and a network model of power, articulations which go back as far as 1843 with the work of Max
Stirner and which have become increasingly commonplace in what John Moore has described as ‘second-wave’ anarchism (Moore, n.d.).

This separation of classical and contemporary anarchism, or of first- and second-wave anarchism, is the distinction between the strongly socialist anarchism that developed in the nineteenth century and which rejected the State and capitalism, and the anarchism that has developed since the 1960s which rejects the totality of relations of domination as such, both macro and micro. Moreover, it is the latter which has, for the most part, addressed and often pre-empted the post-structural critique. This division is useful conceptually but is equally something of a caricature, ignoring the subtleties and nuances of classical anarchist thinkers, the prevalence of classical anarchist concepts in contemporary anarchism, and the many chronological discrepancies in making a neat division during the 1960s. Thus, in making this argument, the separation of these tendencies is made only to delineate the critique at hand: the first section aims to describe a classical anarchism replete with all its faults before we move towards articulating a post-anarchism in the second section.

While post-structuralism is integral in developing a new understanding of power and the production of subjectivity, it has little to say on the prospects of resistance and social transformation. Foucault appeared reluctant to speak on the project of social transformation at all, except in later works on ‘technologies of the self’, while Deleuze gives extended treatments to resistance, the ‘war machine’ and the nomadic subject, but only in the most abstract form. To broach these absences, we shall in our final section turn towards contemporary anarchist theory and practice, and specifically the body of theory derived from Italy known as ‘insurrectionary anarchism’, so as to extrapolate a methodology of resistance that is in concordance with our new understanding of the social. The perils of resistance are many, and must seek to avoid obliteration by the State, the often more subtle processes of cooptation and recuperation of dissent and, of course, outright ineffectuality. In the end, we shall find that social transformation lies in social experimentation, in the need to open up fissures of time and space and create radical new forms of subjectivities and body-object assemblages, in the need for generalised revolt focussing on anonymous and autonomous tactics easily reproducible throughout the social terrain, and mass exodus from the apparatuses of domination.

Before beginning, it is worth comparing this move with what has become known as post-Marxism. In their survey of post-Marxism, Simon Tormey and Jules Townshend delineate six key issues with classical Marxist theory that various post-Marxist theorists have sought to resolve. These are: Marx’s teleological, directional and dialectic conception of history; the account of the revolutionary subject in the industrial proletariat, organised within the Party apparatus; the denial of

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2 For example, Max Stirner, Gustav Landauer, and Emma Goldman all contain elements of second-wave anarchism despite writing well before the 1960s, while Colin Ward, for example, represents a transitional figure writing in the 1950s, and both Murray Bookchin and Daniel Guerin maintained to a large extent a classical anarchist perspective well past the 1960s.
the importance of human subjectivity in revolutionary change and ethical deliberation; positivism and
the scientific prioritisation of capitalist labour over other struggles; vanguardism and the role of
intellectuals; and, finally, the problem of democracy (Tormey & Townshend, 2006: 5). While these
concerns have been central in rejuvenating Marxist theory, they are only of peripheral significance in
anarchist theory. Indeed, the latter two issues – vanguardism and democracy – have been central in
the anarchist rejection of Marxism from the outset and need not be addressed at all, and similarly
teleological notions of history and positivism have been either only weakly asserted or explicitly
rejected. 3 Only the questions regarding the revolutionary subject, and that of ethics shall here be
addressed. For the most part post-Marxism has been a disappointing endeavour. It has either turned
towards explicit forms of liberal capitalism, articulating a ‘politics of demand’, as in the work of
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe or, at the other end of the spectrum as in the work of Antonio
Negri and Michael Hardt, it has been quietly – yet only partially – importing anarchist ideas, in the
end arriving at an uneasy middleground alternating between an anti-hegemonic and a counter-
hegemonic project, between multitudes and ‘the multitude’ (Day, 2005: 80, 144-154).

Post-anarchism is a project certainly not without precedent. It was first articulated by Todd
May in The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism (1994), and followed up by Saul Newman’s
From Bakunin to Lacan (2001) and Richard Day’s Gramsci is Dead (2005), amongst numerous other
lesser known works. May’s book has been central in setting up the key parameters of the debate,
despite characterising anarchism only in its classical form and making little use of contemporary
developments. 4 Newman’s book, too, commits the same error before coming to arrive at a
conclusion suspiciously liberal in inclination. The work of Day, of the three, is certainly the most
well-grounded in both contemporary anarchist theory and practice but fails to draw out the
implications of post-anarchism for resistance. It is in this present work which draws from all three
that I hope to describe both the project of post-anarchism – as differing from classical anarchism –
and the radical implications for practice.

3 Both Murray Bookchin and Peter Kropotkin break with this general rejection. Bookchin, arguably as much Marxist
as anarchist, maintained a certain historicism that saw the capitalist development of the means of production and the
dawning of a ‘post-scarcity’ society as requisites for anarchism (see Bookchin, 2004). Kropotkin, a renowned botanist,
entertained a limited positivism in the application of his evolutionary theory (where mutual aid, as opposed to
competition, was decisive for successful species) to human society, arguing that nature proved cooperation to be
more successful in the long-term (see Kropotkin, 1902).
4 For critiques of post-anarchism as dismissive of the nuances of classical and contemporary anarchist theory, among
other things, see: Cohn, Jesse & Wilbur, Shawn (2003) and Moore, John (n.d.).
I. Classical Anarchism and the A Priori that Haunts

Either the State for ever, crushing individual and local life, taking over in all fields of human activity, bringing with it its wars and its domestic struggles for power, its palace revolutions which only replace one tyrant by another, and inevitably at the end of this development there is … death!

Or the destruction of States, and new life starting again in thousands of centres on the principle of the lively initiative of the individual and groups and that of free agreement.

The choice lies with you!

– Peter Kropotkin, The State.

Glimpses of the anarchist project have been articulated throughout history, in the philosophy of Lao Tzu from the sixth century BCE, to the Greek Stoics of the third century BCE, the Diggers and Ranters of the seventeenth century English revolution and the Énragés of the French revolution (Marshall, 1993). More importantly, the anarchist condition has likely been in continual existence in varying forms for at least the last 40,000 years of human history, and is realised contemporaneously, for example, in the social organisation of the Piaroa who live along the tributaries of Orinoco, the Tiv living along the Benue River in central Nigeria and among those living in Highland Madagascar (Graeber, 2004: 26-28). The formal conception of the anarchist project, however, arose amidst the early socialist movements throughout Europe in the eighteenth century, both as an organic expression – or contempt, rather – against the State and its forces, and simultaneously as a conscious political project articulated by early writers such as William Godwin, Max Stirner and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Indeed, it was the latter who was the first to use the term ‘anarchist’ and inverse its popular meaning, declaring that ‘anarchy is order’. Also known as libertarian socialism, anarchism focused crucially on the need for both economic and political freedom, insisting that “freedom without socialism is privilege and injustice, and that socialism without freedom is slavery and brutality” (Dolgov, 1980: 269). In achieving prominence during the nineteenth century, however, it necessarily came to heads with the contending school of socialism led by Karl Marx.

At the 1872 meeting at The Hague of what would later come to be known as the First International, Marx, as a member of the General Council, managed to arrange the expulsion of the influential anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, precipitating the end of the organisation and the birth of the historic divide between Marxism and anarchism (May, 1994: 45). While the debate within the First International was vitriolic and personal at times, the political dispute was fundamental to the differences between the two socialisms, namely a question of the State and the process of revolutionary transformation. Marx understood economic forces and the relations of production as central to determining the structure of society, including all historical, cultural and political
phenomena. The apparent autonomy of this latter aspect, and specifically the State, was in reality a result of a particular mode of production. Thus, in classical Marxism, the State becomes a tool of the bourgeoisie and an apparatus that is apparently neutral, determined by the governing class interests. The question of revolution therefore becomes one of economic ascendancy, as the rise of the proletariat over and against the bourgeoisie in a dictatorship of the proletariat that would no longer embody particularistic class interests, but would instead be a universal State given the role of the proletariat as the universal class. In this struggle, the State becomes a means with which the proletariat achieves this ascendancy, and the dictatorship of the proletariat – as a transitional period – remains in place until class domination is entirely abolished. Without class domination, the need for political domination similarly disappears and thus the State withers away, realising the endpoint of historical development in communism (Newman, 2001: 24).

The anarchist critique recognised the economic reductionism of Marxism as unsatisfactory and, with regards to revolutionary change, as dangerous. Anarchism recognised the State not as a mere instrument of class interests, but fundamentally as a form of domination in itself replete with its own specific interests. Bakunin, therefore, announced that “whoever says State necessarily says domination, and, consequently, slavery” (Bakunin, 2005: 195). The strength of this domination differed little between States, between democracies or otherwise, and central to the anarchist critique was a rejection of representation and universal suffrage, both deemed as farcical. This was, firstly, a rejection that the sheer differences among the people could be represented in the unity of the State, or that the representatives could better know the people than they knew themselves. Thus Proudhon could ask, “But why might the honourable bourgeoisie who make up the middle class have a better grasp of my true interests than I do?” (Proudhon, 2005: 92). It was secondly, and more substantially, a rejection of representation as in any way embodying the will of the people, declaring instead that it was “a lie that shrouds the despotism of the leading minority” (Bakunin, 2005: 195). In the dispute with Marx, however, it was a third aspect – the corrupting role of power – that was central. Those who took positions within the State, no matter from which class they came, were treated with the greatest suspicion, as corrupted by the trappings of privilege and power. Thus, the dictatorship of the proletariat was attacked primarily in that the necessary representation, of the proletariat by members of the proletariat, would only reproduce the oppressive mechanisms of the State:

[The representatives,] the Marxians argue, will be made up of workers. Yes, to be sure, of former workers who, as soon as they become the people’s governors and representatives, will stop being

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5 As with any interpretation of Marx, this is disputed. Indeed, in Marx’s work *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1919), a quite different view of the State is presented, one that has a certain degree of autonomy and its own interests. In any case, while these interpretations exist, they have always formed a minor part in the history of Marxism and, evidently, were deemed unimportant by Marx himself in his dispute with Bakunin.
workers and will begin to look down upon the proletariat from the heights of the State: they will represent, not the people, but themselves and their ambitions to govern it (Bakunin, 2005: 195).

The anarchist position, therefore, was both a rejection of the oppressive mechanisms of the State *qua* State, and a rejection that the State or centralisation, even merely as a transitional phase, could provide the means towards realising freedom. With regards to revolutionary struggle, means were required to be consonant with ends and it was considered that “freedom [could] only be conjured up by freedom, that is to say, by uprising by the entire people and by free organisation of the toiling masses from the bottom up” (Bakunin, 2005: 196). Thus, as opposed to the Marxist strategy of the pursuit and capture of State power – whether through revolution or reform – the classical anarchist project advocated the immediate destruction of the State and Capitalism, and the necessity for revolutionary organisation to be strictly egalitarian. The reasons for this position, we must be clear, were *strategic*, and were based on the recognition that structures of power only led to greater excesses of power, not less.

Despite rejecting the economic reductionism of Marxism, classical anarchism tended to commit the same error, locating instead in the State, or a State-Capital hybrid, the source of social domination and authority within society.6 That is, the entirety of authority and social domination tended to be reduced to the mechanisms of the State, substituting “the opposition between capital and labour [to] that between the State and civil society. Capital, as foil and scapegoat, is replaced by the State, that cold monster whose limitless growth ‘pauperises’ social life…” (Donzelot, cited in Newman, 2001: 47). Thus, seemingly disparate struggles – against wage slavery, war, colonisation – achieved a universalism in the struggle against the State, and instances of social domination in everyday life were viewed as effects of forces originating in the State. Moreover, the State was conceived as an apparatus that existed as distinct and transcendent to ‘the masses’, but which could nonetheless ensnare them and come to act as a “yoke” upon the otherwise autonomous organisation of the people:

Beneath the apparatus of government, under the shadow of its political institutions, society was slowly and silently producing its own organisation, making for itself a new order which expressed its vitality and autonomy (Bakunin, cited in Guerin, 1970: 41).

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6 In more recent writings of an essentially classical anarchist character, we see two approaches to incorporating struggles against sexism, racism, ecological devastation, etc. The first is the extreme position to reduce these back to the State and capitalism typical of a number of ‘Platformist’ and ‘class struggle’ anarchist groups, and exemplified in a paper by a South African anarchist collective: “Capitalism and the State are the primary cause of all special oppressions. It follows that the fight against racism etc. must be a fight against capitalism and the State” (Bakisha Media Collective, n.d.). The second is to create a limited plurality of roots of power, such that in addition to the State and capitalism, patriarchy, white supremacy and anthropocentrism become the new roots of all actualised instances of power. In both cases, however, we see a concept of power that remains founded upon a suppressive assumption, is unitary, and appears as transcendent to ‘the masses’.
With this understanding of power, the revolutionary project becomes a conceptually simple matter, as Kropotkin as written:

> Overthrow the State and the federated society will sprout from its ruins, truly one, truly indivisible,
> but free and expanding in solidarity by virtue of that very freedom (Kropotkin, 2005: 310).

We can thus identify two key assumptions about the operations of power. This is, firstly, a conception of power as working top-down, with a singular transcendent point of origin from which all authority emanates. Secondly, power is suppressive, denying the autonomous organisation of society.

Contrary to Marxism, the industrial proletariat as the universal revolutionary subject in anarchism, precisely because the economic mode of production is no longer considered determinate. The revolutionary subject in classical anarchism, rather, is the much broader notion of those outside of power, outside of the State. Even while suppressed under the yoke of the State, the masses remain uncorrupted by the trappings of power and thus come to form a pure place of resistance (Newman, 2001: 47). Anarchism’s revolutionary subject is the expansive notion of ‘the people’, ‘the masses’, the exploited and oppressed, and includes the general poor, the unemployed, the proletariat, and the peasants from which the autonomous organisation of society and the full unleashing of the creativity of masses originates. Indeed, there is often a valorisation of the oppressed, or what Nietzsche disapprovingly declared as anarchism’s retention of the ‘slave morality’ (Koch, 2004: 49). There is, moreover, a strong humanism prevalent throughout classical anarchism, asserting that within humanity lies an essential desire, ability and inclination towards cooperation, egalitarian relations and a general sociability that awaits only to be set free. Of this latent potentiality, Kropotkin writes:

> [W]e are persuaded that the great majority of mankind, in proportion to their degree of enlightenment and the completeness with which they free themselves from existing fetters will behave and act always in a direction useful to society (Kropotkin, cited in May, 1994: 64; emphasis added)

This insistence of an essential human desire towards cooperation, and the complementary suppressive assumption about power, are fundamental both to the classical anarchist conceptualisation of the social and of revolutionary transformation; indeed, these assumptions have been described by Todd May as the a priori of anarchism (May, 1994: 65).

The ability to conceive of an ‘outside’ of power, in absence of or beyond the reach of the State, makes the positive conception of freedom quite unproblematic. As the etymology of anarchism suggests – literally, ‘in absence of authority’ – freedom is the natural condition towards which humans are inclined when relieved of the burden of the State. We see, therefore, that the potentially painful deliberations on the nature of freedom, and the necessary introduction of ethics, are largely avoided, bypassed instead by anarchism’s humanist naturalism (May, 1994: 63).
Classical anarchism contained within it a division between the ‘evolutionists’, such as William Godwin, who believed society could be progressively reformed to realise a state of anarchy (Marshall, 1993: 212, 216), and the ‘revolutionists’ such as Bakunin, who believed it would require a violent confrontation with the forces of the State. The latter perspective, however, was considerably the most widespread. Revolution, as opposed to reform, was understood as a radical rupture with previous social relations, realised in the abolition of the State. It was the large-scale transformation of social relations, different not just in degree but in kind. Moreover, a post-revolutionary anarchist society was deemed to have achieved a sense of emancipatory finality:

Thus the social revolution will be made, and, once revolution’s foes have been stripped of all means of harming it, there will be no further need to proceed against them with bloody measures… (Bakunin, 2005: 164).

The concepts of revolution and of revolutionary finality were founded upon the idea that instances of authority were rooted in the singularity of the State, and with its destruction the possibility of a return of authority was similarly vanquished. It was not necessarily, as many anarchists were quick to point out, the realisation of utopia, but it did set the initial conditions for the progressive realisation and “unlimited perfectibility of social arrangements”, previously stifled by the State (Rocker, cited in Gordon, 2007: 118). This was, to a large degree, the millenarian influence upon early anarchist thought.

In this brief description, we come to an image of classical anarchism much closer to Marxism than either Bakunin or Marx would likely have acknowledged. While certainly diverging on the question of authority and the State, both retained a similar conception of power and subjectivity. In both, power was conceived as derived ultimately from a single, unitary, organising principle, one that existed transcendent to the social realm and was imposed from above; the difference between the two socialisms was largely a disagreement about the content of the organising principle itself. Moreover, in both we find a valorisation of an existing social category – whether the limited category of the industrial proletariat in Marxism, or the expansive category of the oppressed in anarchism – as bearers of social transformation. The oppressed, in anarchism, represent an ‘outside’ of power and a pure place of resistance, from which the essential human tendencies towards cooperation and egalitarianism will arise if relieved of the burden of the State. These two fundamental conceptions of the social – the dynamics of power and essence of human subjectivity – are the \textit{a priori} of anarchism and are foundational to many other anarchist conceptions, in particular the unproblematic notion of freedom as an absence of authority and the conception of revolution as a qualitative social rupture. This \textit{a priori} relies upon posing a secondary, transcendent ontological realm that exists behind and within everything. In challenging this \textit{a priori} we must instead come to articulate a theory of the social
committed to a metaphysics of immanence, and remain resolutely committed to a single ontological realm in our description of the social.
II. Post-Anarchism

Within the work of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze we find a twofold challenge to the a priori of classical anarchism. In the first instance, the post-structuralist conception of power is decentred, where power is immanent to every relation, and where large-scale structures of domination are derived not from above or without, but from below. Secondly, post-structuralism poses that bodies, rather than being shaped by an essential self, are produced by forces acting upon them. Power thus becomes productive, continually reconstituting subjectivities. These two challenges, and the image of the social that appears, will allow us to articulate a form of anarchism concomitant to post-structuralism.

A New Conception of Power and the Social

In his first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Michel Foucault advances an immanent and rhizomatic conception of power, putting forward three key propositions (Foucault, 1998: 94). The first proposition poses that power is not something that is possessed, but rather it is exercised from innumerable points. In this conception power ceases to be an object or status with which one is simply imbued, but instead becomes an event or a process that is continually enacted. In an interview shortly before his death, Foucault clarifies the point, arguing for a conception of power as a relation:

“...I scarcely use the word the word ‘power’, and when I use it on occasion it is simply as a shorthand for the expression I generally use: ‘relations of power’” (Foucault, 1996: 441). In Deleuzian terminology, power is described as force, which is to say, it exists only in the moment of its application and therefore one does not bare, but may only exercise power; power is a event. Moreover, in this first proposition we see an explicit rejection of power as emanating from a centre. Rather, it is exercised from innumerable points, and in every interaction.

This is similar to the second proposition, which claims that relations of power do not exist in a position of exteriority to other types of relationships, but are immanent to all interactions and are thus productive (Foucault, 1998: 94). Power, therefore, is not characteristic only of a limited range of relations – between the policeman and the civilian, the employer and the worker – but rather is exercised in every domain and in every relation. Spheres of interaction demarcated as ‘private’ or simply trivial and thus deemed void of political content instead become immediately political.

I am not thinking [of governments, masters, etc.], when I speak of “relations of power”. I mean that in human relationships, whether they involve verbal communication such as we are engaged in at this

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7 The ability to weave both Foucault's and Deleuze's conception of power together in a single description is possible due to the convergence of both theories. The principle divergence lies not in the understanding of power, but in the approach: Deleuze's is metaphysical and valid for all time, while Foucault's conception is historical (May, 1994: 73).
moment or amorous, institutional or economic relationships, power is always present. (Foucault, 1996: 441).

In this conception the exercise of power is essential to any interaction. This is not to say, however, that every interaction is characterised by a relationship of domination, but rather the lesser claim that power is a requisite for affectuation. Foucault’s conception of power rejects, for example, John Holloway’s \textit{a priori} division of forces into ‘power-to’ and ‘power-over’, and instead locates both within a single field (Holloway, 2002).\textsuperscript{8}

Foucault’s third proposition posits that power originates from below, which is to say structures of domination emerge from specific orientations of local practices of power (Foucault, 2002: 94). Foucault denies the binary division between rulers and ruled, claiming instead that the “major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by [manifold relationships of force]” (Foucault, 2002: 94). The effects of local practices of power may come to constitute relations of domination in two ways – both ontologically and historically. The first aspect, the ontological constitution, forms the basis of Deleuze’s distinction between micro-politics and macro-politics. These categories are not simply the return to the realms of the individual and of the State, but designate instead a number of overlapping strata, where each macro-political level is \emph{produced} and \emph{emerges} from the interactions of the strata immediately below. The process of emergence is \emph{non-linear}: forces interact in novel ways, are redirected or reappropriated, and may have effects that were unintended or unforeseeable in their local application. Thus neither the micro-political nor the macro-political are simply reducible to one another.\textsuperscript{9} “In short, everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a \textit{macropolitics} and a \textit{micropolitics}” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 235). This is an open-ended conception of the social, where emergent strata are constituted ontologically from the bottom-up, but may themselves react back upon the strata below, providing both constraints and resources (De Landa, 2006: 34). In contrast to the classical anarchist perspective, therefore, this is a conception where micro-politics is primary and macro-politics, though not necessarily wrong, is by itself inadequate as it cannot capture the excess from which it forms. The second component to the constitution of power is historical, and is articulated best in Foucault’s investigation in \textit{Discipline and Punish} (1995). Here we see once again a bottom-up constitution of power, where localised and disparate disciplinary techniques, developed initially as part of attempts towards the liberal reform of the prison system, spread bit by bit throughout the social terrain, adopted and applied in very

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\bibliography{author=Deleuze, year=2004b, title=In short, everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a \textit{macropolitics} and a \textit{micropolitics}.}

\bibliography{author=De Landa, year=2006, title=The process of emergence is derived from complexity theory on which Manuel De Landa has written extensively. See De Landa’s \textit{Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy} (2005) and \textit{A New Philosophy of Society} (2006).}
different ways to schools, factories and the military. The capillary spread of these techniques were not the result of a transcendent force guiding history, nor bourgeois conspiracy or class strategy, but rather resulted from

…a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another, support one another, distinguish themselves from one another according to their domain of application, converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method (Foucault, 1995: 138).

Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari argue,

All molar functionalism is false, since the organic or social machines are not formed in the same way they function, and the technical machines are not assembled in the same way they are used, but imply precisely specific conditions that separate their own production from their distinct product (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 316).

This is thus a conception of power that rejects both the a priori constitution of the State, for example, as existing prior to the parts of which it is constituted, and equally this conception rejects the teleological historicism sometimes posed in describing the development of assemblages of domination. The form of these assemblages of domination, therefore, arises immanent to the parts from which they are formed and is not the result of an external organising principle.

It is important to stress that the saturation of power and force in every interaction is not a capitulation to domination. Foucault identifies domination as a particular relation of forces “in which the power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen […] fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom” (Foucault, 1996: 434, 441). That all relations involve power does not mean, therefore, that we cannot evaluate specific instances of power as to how they encourage or discourage equitable relations, between relations of domination and relations of relative fluidity:

I do not think that society can exist without power relations. […] The problem, then, is not to try and dissolve them in a utopia of completely transparent communication, but to acquire […] the ethos, the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as possible (Foucault, 1996: 446).

Moreover, just as power is a relation, so too is freedom a practice, to be evaluated based on its effects which can only be known by causal interventions in reality, which is to say, by experimentation (De Landa, 2005: 72). Freedom, therefore, is not a condition in absence of authority, but is instead a becoming, an “ongoing actuality” (Foucault, cited in Day, 2005: 137), in need of perpetual re-evaluation and continual experimentation of alternative mechinic connections, alternative body-object assemblages (May, 2005: 133). This latter aspect – experimentation – is all the more important
given the non-linear production of macro-politics from micro-political practices, and is something we shall come back to at length in section three.

In anarchist theory we can identify a similar strand of argumentation. Starting with the German anarchist Gustav Landauer, writing before his murder in 1919, we see a conception of power very different to that asserted in classical anarchism. For Landauer, the State does not exist as transcendent to the people, but is rather “a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of human behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently toward one another […] We are the State…” (Landauer, cited in Gordon, 2007: 114). A similar argument was made more recently by the American anarchist Bob Black:

The real enemy is not an object apart from life. It is the organisation of life by powers detached from it and turned against it. The apparatus, not the personnel, is the real enemy. But it is by and through the apparatchiks and everyone else participating in the system that domination and deception are made manifest. […] It includes all the policemen, all the social workers, all the office workers, all the nuns, all the op-ed columnists… (Black, cited in Gordon, 2007: 101).

This is a clear rejection of the State as existing separately from the people, and rather implicates the practices of everyday life as constitutive of various macro-political entities. Indeed, this is quite contrary to the classical anarchist assertion whereby power is ultimately derived from the singular loci of the State and capitalism. The removal of the “yoke” of the State so as to realise the autonomous organisation of the people, therefore, becomes conceptually impossible. Implicated as we already are in the processes of the State, there is nothing to guarantee those processes will not simply be reproduced. In an anonymous 1979 pamphlet printed in Britain, we find a cogent argument against this notion of Kropotkin’s ‘autonomous people’:

You can’t blow up a social relationship. The total collapse of this society would provide no guarantee about what replaced it. Unless a majority of people had the ideas and organization sufficient for the creation of an alternative society, we would see the old world reassert itself because it is what people would be used to, what they believed in, what existed unchallenged in their own personalities (anon, 1979).

To complement this, in Colin Ward’s 1973 *Anarchy in Action* we see a distinctly Foucauldian conception of power as immanent to all relations (despite retaining a notion of power as possessed):

It is as though every individual possessed a certain quantity of power, but that by default, negligence, or thoughtless and unimaginative habit or conditioning, he has allowed someone else to pick it up, rather than use it for himself for his own purposes (Ward, 1973: 19).

The task of social transformation, therefore, becomes not the abolition of power, but rather its redirection elsewhere and towards different tasks. Freedom cannot be conceived as a mere absence of power, but as a particular organisation of power relations so as to meet specific ends. This notion of *freedom as practice* is realised explicitly in a publication written by the New York based ‘Curious
George Brigade: “The communities are in resistance *because they rechannel power to everybody* by resisting both internal and external urges towards centralising power” (Curious George Brigade, 2003; emphasis added).

**The Subject as Effect and the Revolutionary Subject-to-Come**

A unique glimpse at the difference between the classical anarchist humanism and the post-structuralist conception of the subject was offered in a 1971 public debate between the anarchist Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault (Chomsky & Foucault, 1971). Of recurring disagreement between the two was the question of human nature. Chomsky, as a linguistic scholar, had advanced a theory that specific grammatical and linguistic patterns are hard-wired into the brain, and argued similarly that the desire for creativity was a natural aspect of the human condition:

> There is no longer any social necessity for human beings to be treated as mechanical elements in the productive process; that can be overcome and we must overcome it by a society of freedom and free association, in which the creative urge that I consider intrinsic to human nature, will in fact be able to realise itself in whatever way it will (Chomsky & Foucault, 1971).

Chomsky’s argument relied on a logic essentially in accordance with classical anarchism, posing both a humanist naturalism and a transcendent conception of power, as well as a notion of revolution similar to that advanced by Kropotkin. In reply, Foucault argued instead that human nature, and thus the derivative notion of justice, is historically constructed and, moreover, that a political project on the basis of these assertions is untenable:

> …you can’t prevent me from believing that these notions of human nature, of justice, of the realisation of the essence of human beings, are all notions and concepts which have been formed within our civilisation, […] and one can’t, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions to describe or justify a fight which should – and shall in principle – overthrow the very fundaments of our society (Chomsky and Foucault, 1971).

In this conception, therefore, the subject becomes an *effect* of the complex interplay of contending forces, which is to say, *power is productive*. This is not to suggest that operations of power are necessarily *good* or *right*, but simply that power relations affect, shape and produce new objects and new bodies, and is a rejection that power is simply suppressive. Subjects, therefore, are not primary as in classical anarchism, but rather are secondary – alongside macro-political assemblages – to the flows of power:

> Subjects and structures are sedimentations of practices whose source cannot be discovered in a privileged ontological domain [i.e. within the individual, or within the structure] but that must be sought, rather, among the specific practices in which they arise (May, 1994: 78).

And in this respect Deleuze is in agreement. In his work *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze writes that “the history of a thing, in general, is the succession of forces which take possession of it and the
coexistence of forces which struggle for possession” (Deleuze, 1983: 3). The body, as a ‘thing’, is therefore denied an essence that exists transcendent to the body, no longer deemed immune to the interplay of forces.

This conception has serious ramifications for classical anarchism. As Foucault made clear in his debate with Chomsky, the notions of justice derived from assuming a natural human essence no longer apply. Moreover, this is not just an absence of an affirmative foundation, but may indeed suggest that subjects are produced desiring their own oppression, where emergent strata react back upon their constituent parts, territorialising bodies and shaping desire that is affirmative of itself, that fulfils its ‘will to power’ (Tormey & Townshend, 2006: 41). This is an abandonment of the ‘the masses’ or ‘the oppressed’ as containing within themselves the seeds of the new world, and forces us to view with great suspicion the ‘spontaneous desires’ of the people, realising that “desire is a mixture, a blend, to such a degree that bureaucratic or fascist pieces are still or already caught up in revolutionary agitation” (Deleuze, cited in May, 1994: 70). The revolutionary subject, therefore, cannot simply be the valorisation of an existing social category but must instead look elsewhere.

In the writings of the early nineteenth century anarchist Max Stirner we find one of the clearest denunciations of the notion of human essence, describing it as a ‘spook’. Stirner was in agreement with Ludwig Feuerbach’s critique of Christianity, where in *The Essence of Christianity* the philosopher claimed that christianity was alienating because it required that man abdicate his own qualities and powers, projecting them onto an abstract God (Newman, 2001: 57). In so doing, however, Feuerbach posited an essential human self that had to be reclaimed, and that man had to realise that the qualities attributed to God were really his own. Stirner rejected this latter aspect, claiming that humanism was the mere usurpation of the realm of God by the essence of man, that “the human religion is only the last metamorphosis of the Christian religion” (Stirner, 1907: 229). Moreover, the conception of a human essence was not merely considered false but, in a move that pre-empted Foucault’s notion of normalisation, was deemed dangerous:

To God, who is spirit, Feuerbach gives the name ‘Our Essence’. Can we put up with this, that ‘Our Essence’ is brought in opposition to us – that we are split into an essential and unessential self? Do we not therewith go back into the dreary misery of seeing ourselves as banished out of ourselves? (Stirner, 1907: 40).

Moreover, it is not just the individual man that has no essence, but the notion of ‘the oppressed’, ‘the people’ – that is, the revolutionary subject of classical anarchism. Stirner claims that ‘the people’ are yet another ‘spook’, as constructed as the constitutional body of government, and hardly a source of revolutionary impulse: “The people (think it something wonderful, you good-hearted folks, what you have in the people) – the people is full of police sentiments through and through” (Stirner, 1907: 262).
Similarly, we find in Landauer a rejection of the revolutionary subject in the proletariat (broadly defined) and, more importantly, a realization that social transformation necessarily means the \textit{abolition} of the category of the oppressed as opposed to its generalization, produced as it is only in relation to domination: “[W]e here do not have to go along with the foolish and shameless flattery of the proletariat since socialism aims at the \textit{abolition} of the proletariat” (Landauer, cited in Day, 2005: 125). More recently, in Italian insurrectionary literature, we see a similar insistence:

The exploited are not carriers of any positive project, be it even the classless society (which all too closely resembles the productive set up). […] The exploited have nothing to manage but their own negation as such (Anonymous, c. 1985).

Though this conception of the abolition of the proletariat appears similar to some ultra-leftist reinterpretations of Marxist theory which speak of the ‘self-\textit{abolition} of the working class,’\(^{10}\) it is different in that it rejects in total the notion of ‘the working class’ as revolutionary subject.

Moreover, and crucially, this rejection of the revolutionary subject in an existing social category is also a rejection of recent classical anarchist attempts at a pluralisation of revolutionary subjects – in workers, women, homosexuals, indigenous people, youth, etc. A rejection of essence, strategic or otherwise, necessarily means a rejection of social struggles that have as their foundational and revolutionary subject particular oppressed identities, commonly known as ‘identity politics’.

Arguing against specifically homosexual identity politics and the implicit notion of a homosexual essence, the contemporary anarchist Jamie Hekert has claimed that the unity required of identity creates a “closed totality” that relies on the exclusion of some elements, “separating the pure from the impure” – echoing the argument of Max Stirner – so as to ultimately entrench the original identities still further (Hekert, 2005: 12).\(^{11}\) The alternative requires a conception of the revolutionary subject as still-to-come, and a \textit{politics of affinity} as opposed to identity (Day, 2005: 188).\(^{12}\) The post-anarchist revolutionary subject must therefore be an \textit{inclination}, an ongoing tendency towards the destabilisation of practices of domination, an orientation that casts practices already extant in doubt, and the continual creative \textit{experimentation} with new forms of social organisation that tend towards the increase of decentralised power relations, thus palpating new modes of existence. In Deleuze’s

\(^{10}\) See, for example, the English journal \textit{Aufheben} which is typical of such reinterpretations of Marx. Available from http://www.geocities.com/aufheben2/

\(^{11}\) Jamie Hekert (2005) has articulated one of the more concise arguments against identity politics from an anarchist perspective. He argues that posing an essence of the ‘homosexual’ or of ‘women’, for example, is not just untenable, but that it is dangerous as it suppresses difference and recreates sexual hierarchies, entrenching existing identities rather than seeking their dissolution. His is a conception of identity as a ‘state from’, to borrow from Deleuze, which is to say, it functions as an apparatus of capture no matter to which ends it is used.

\(^{12}\) The distinction between a politics of affinity and politics of identity is the similar to Deleuze’s distinction between \textit{subjected groups} and \textit{subject groups}. “Subjected groups think and act in terms of molar lines, machines, organisms. Their world consists solely of actualities, never of virtualities that might be actualised. […] It is pure Nietzschean negativity. […] Subject groups seek new possibilities, new formations. […] constructing revolutionary connections in opposition to the conjugations of the axiomatic” (May, 2005: 148-149).
vocabulary, this is a ‘becoming-minor’, which is to say the revolutionary subject is a project that seeks to create “a space of becoming […] posited as a space of affinity and symbiosis between adjacent forces” (Braidotti, cited in Day, 2005: 143). Solidarity on this basis is not founded upon similarity of existing identities, but rather upon the orientation of collective projects, of affinity with one another.\footnote{Richard Day: “A politics of affinity […] is not about abandoning identification as such; it is about abandoning the fantasy that fixed, stable identities are possible and desirable, that one identity is better than another, that superior identities deserve more of the good and less of the bad that a social order has to offer, and that the state-form should act as arbiter of who gets what” (2005: 188).}

**Revolution as Difference in Degree**

The classical anarchist notion of revolution as qualitative change, as a social transformation in kind, was to be realised by the destruction of the centre of power in the State and the unleashing of the autonomous tendencies of the people. The post-structuralist reconception of power, however, as decentred, immanent and operating from below, coupled with the eradication of the ‘the oppressed’ as the seed-bearers of a truly free society, makes this conception of revolution, as opposed to reform, quite untenable. As Foucault has remarked,\footnote{The criteria for this distinction has perhaps been best articulated by the 1970s British libertarian socialist group Solidarity. They were largely of a classical libertarian socialist orientation, and this shows in their reference to ‘the masses’, but is nonetheless one of the better articulations: “Meaningful action, for revolutionaries, is whatever increases the confidence, the autonomy, the initiative, the participation, the solidarity, the equalitarian tendencies and the self-activity of the masses and whatever assists in their demystification. Sterile and harmful action is whatever reinforces the passivity of the masses, their apathy, their cynicism, their differentiation through hierarchy, their alienation, their reliance on others to do things for them and the degree to which they can therefore be manipulated by others – even by those allegedly acting on their behalf” (Solidarity, 1967).}

It seems to me that this whole intimidation with the bogy of reform is linked to the lack of a strategic analysis appropriate to political struggle, to struggles in the field of political power. The role for theory today seems to me to be just this: not to formulate the global systematic theory which holds everything in place, but to analyse the specificity of mechanisms of power, to locate the connections and extensions, to build little by little a strategic knowledge (Foucault, cited in May, 1994: 55).

Which is to say, the revolution versus reform argument which is central to classical anarchism is a non sequitur; the cataclysmic rupture of revolution, given the actual operations of power, was never a possibility. Anarchism seeks not the reorientation or capture of existing political machines, but instead their destruction so as to open up space for alternative social organisation. Social transformation must be understood, therefore, in the same terms as power is constituted: as decentred and operating from below. That is, social transformation must occur on the terrain of everyday life first, realising that it is from this terrain that the larger macro-political entities are constituted. The cleavage in the argument transforms from ‘revolution versus reform’, and instead becomes about deciding between practices that are constitutive of assemblages of domination and those practices that instead produce relations tending towards the full decentralisation of power.\footnote{Richard Day: “A politics of affinity […] is not about abandoning identification as such; it is about abandoning the fantasy that fixed, stable identities are possible and desirable, that one identity is better than another, that superior identities deserve more of the good and less of the bad that a social order has to offer, and that the state-form should act as arbiter of who gets what” (2005: 188).} This is, perhaps, the ‘lifestyle anarchism’ that the anarchist Murray Bookchin so viciously riled against
in his 1995 polemic *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An unbridgeable chasm*, but with the explicit aim for the viral and capillary spread of these practices. Revolutionary changes, then, are changes of *degree* that are widespread in their application (May, 2005: 54).

Such changes of degree, by their nature, can never achieve the utopian finality of classical anarchism. Rather, “there is no final struggle, only a series of partisan struggles on a number of fronts” (Ward, 1973: 26). Just as the State is never final in its colonisation of everyday life, and just as it is these fissures from which anarchists have drawn their hope, so too can a revolutionary society never be total; the state form, according to Deleuze, exists always, “immemorial Urstaat’, such that it “comes into the world fully formed and rises up in a single stroke” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005b: 472). Revolution is not a final state, but rather an orientation towards social experimentation, towards constant re-evaluation, fighting against those tendencies of domination already extant, fighting those that reappear, and coming to perceive new forms of domination that arise for the first time. The dangers of a closed conception of revolution have been most vibrantly articulated by the anarchist and science fiction writer Ursula Le Guin in her book *The Dispossessed* (1974/2002). Depicting a future anarchist society, Le Guin depicts a utopia that has become staid, in which new forms of domination are appearing, and in which the old liberatory forms of organisation have become rigid and oppressive. As Raymond Williams has observed, *The Dispossessed* argues for,

an open utopia: forced open, after the congealing of ideals, the degeneration of mutuality into conservatism; shifted, deliberately, from its achieved harmonious condition, the stasis in which the classical utopian mode culminates, to restless, open, risk-taking experiment (Williams, cited in Gordon, 2007: 120).

The concept of revolution, therefore, is not a final state, not a *being*, but a *becoming*, which is to say, post-anarchism is an eternally *prefigurative* politics. Put differently, “liquidating the lie of the transitional period […] means making the revolt itself a different way of conceiving relations” (Anonymous, c.1985; emphasis in original). Unlike classical anarchism, this is not an insistence that means must be consonant with ends for *strategic* reasons, but rather that there is no clear distinction between means and ends at all. The content of this prefigurative politics, the *resistance*, will be the topic of the next section.
III. Insurrection, Prefiguration and Social War

...you must trust in non-unified, incoherent, non-hegemonic forces for social change, because hegemonic forces cannot produce anything that will look like change to you at all.

– Richard Day, *Gramsci is Dead*

WE HAVE COME TO A NEW CONCEPTION of the revolutionary subject as a *becoming*, as an orientation of revolt and experimentation guided by an ethics against domination. Similarly, we have arrived at a notion of revolution as an open-ended process that seeks not a cataclysmic change of *degree*, but widespread change of *kind* in the realisation and deepening of freedom as a practice, as a particular arrangement of power relations. The precise nature of this becoming, often known simply as *resistance* but more appropriately termed as *anarchist practice*, requires both destructive and constructive moments. We shall see in this exploration that our new conception of power no longer allows us the grand strategies of classical anarchism and Marxism, and rather a turn towards multifarious and decentred *tactics* is required, which when taken as a whole can be characterised as a ‘social war’.

Drawing from contemporary anarchist practice, we shall then look at a number of tactics already extant that are useful in shedding light on post-anarchist social transformation.

**Historical Tendencies of Anarchist Resistance**

First, however, it shall prove useful to consider the historical strategies of anarchist resistance. There has never been an anarchist programme as such, but it is possible to delineate three general tendencies in anarchist practice: insurrectionary anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, and evolutionary anarchism. The insurrectionary model of anarchist transformation is the oldest. It can be seen in much of the anarchist writing around the Paris commune, was attempted unsuccessfully by the Italian anarchist Errico Malatesta in the late 19th century (Marshall, 1993: 347), and is implicit in much of the ‘propaganda of the deed’ anarchist bombings of the 1890s (Marshall, 1993: 437). It was most successfully realised, however, in the Russian revolution of 1917 by the Mahknovshchina. The Mahknovshchina was an anarchist army, led by Nestor Mahkno, which fought a war centred in the Ukraine against the nationalist ‘whites’ at first and later, upon their betrayal, against the Bolshevik Red Army until its ultimate defeat in 1921 to the Bolsheviks. At its height the army consisted of as many as 15,000 troops (Marshall, 1993: 474). The army was of a traditional structure, organised hierarchically and centralised under Mahkno’s command, but was committed to encouraging

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15 It is important to differentiate between this ‘insurrectionary tendency’ and what I have elsewhere described as the ‘contemporary Italian insurrectionary school’. The first is a loose orientation towards resistance, while the second is a more coherent school dating from the 1980s and based around the Italian anarchist Alfredo Bonanno (currently imprisoned in Italy at 70 years of age for being the ‘ideological leader’ of a number of local anarchist groups).
‘liberated territories’ to organise themselves. That is, upon expelling nationalist or Bolshevik military units from Ukrainian areas the army refused to involve itself further in the administration of those territories. The insurrectionary model was in many ways Kropotkin’s notion of revolution, removing the ‘yoke’ of the State so as to unleash the autonomous organisation of the people. The Ukraine was a unique situation, however, as much of the country was dominated by a peasant form of social organisation and Russian control of the Ukraine was only of a spectacular nature, where military outposts only loosely imposed State order. Thus, with the dissolution of Russian control, the Ukrainian peasants returned to a form of social organisation that had, for the most part, persisted despite Russian colonisation. This insurrectionary model has many similarities to the contemporary Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico, which began with a short-lived uprising in 1994. Here we also find a traditionally organised army, positioned under the control of the Zapatista communities which have attempted, for the most part, to bring back traditional, indigenous forms of social organisation (see Ross, 2000).

While the insurrectionary model placed its emphasis on the destructive moment of social transformation, the evolutionary tendency instead placed significant emphasis on the constructive moment, in the building of anarchist organisations and institutions as a means towards social transformation. Such schemes include Proudhon’s cooperative banks that were set up, and quickly failed, in 1848 (Marshall, 1993: 244), the widespread anarchist and modern school movement set up by Francisco Ferrer in the early twentieth century (Ward, 2004: 55), to the commune movements of the 1970s. The aim of these institutions was to simultaneously create new, more liberatory practices and new subjectivities. The latter aspect – being especially important in ‘deschooling’, for example – had been emphasised from as early as the turn of the nineteenth century by William Godwin, and strove to create people both desiring of freedom and capable of relating as such (Marshall, 1993: 212). Despite the apparent innocuousness of the evolutionary model, however, the newly founded institutions faced risks of their own, namely integration into the State. For the most part the projects were fully legal, choosing instead to challenge just one aspect of contemporary practices, and it was this concordance with remaining hegemonic practices that put them at particular risk of integration or cooptation into the State, such that their ‘success’ paradoxically meant failure of their initial goals. In any case, despite the modern school movement and the brief fascination with the commune movement of the 1970s, the evolutionary model has always been a subdued tendency in anarchist practices of resistance.

The most clearly articulated tendency in anarchist resistance has been anarcho-syndicalism. Anarcho-syndicalism reached its zenith during what is popularly known as the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939, with large areas of the province of Catalonia organised, if only briefly, into rural communes and self-managed industries. The tactics involved were a form of revolutionary trade
unionism. The idea was to “form the new world in the shell of the old”, which involved forming a
decentralised and federated union, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), fomenting workers’
discontent, building confidence in taking action against their working conditions, and also training
and preparing workers for taking over and self-managing the means of production following the
great ‘general strike’. When the leftist Popular Front succeeded in the 1936 national elections, the
right, led by General Franco, organised a coup and rose up in rebellion. In Catalonia, preparations by
the CNT had already been made for such an eventuality, and before soldiers stationed in the region
were deployed as part of the coup they were disarmed by anarchist militias. Urban anarchist workers
put into effect their workplace training and began self-management of their workplaces while rural
communities, too, experimented with a number of forms of organisation ranging from full libertarian
communism to collectivism.16 Though the civil war dragged on until 1939, anarchist forms of
organising were only briefly realised in initial months after the coup, until Republican and
Communist forces coupled with the cooption of influential anarchists began reinstituting Republican,
as opposed to anarchist, order (for anarchist involvement in the civil war, see Peirats, 1998; Bookchin,
1998).

There are a number of evaluations that can be made about these historical tendencies of
anarchist resistance. The insurrectionary model has only been successful in those areas that have not
been subject to the full penetration of the state-form into practices of everyday life, and thus where
alternative practices have survived. The degree to which these alternative practices are liberatory,
however, is not in any way guaranteed. In addition this model, as essentially Kropotkinian, retains a
view of power as top-down, as suppressive, and as emanating from a central source – in this case the
nationalist or Bolshevik military. Moreover there is a great risk in the centralisation of coercive and
violent forces within the insurrectionary army as opposed to, for example, the decentralised and
horizontal organisation of the anarchist militias during the Spanish Civil War. The full success of the
revolution in the insurrectionary model necessarily means the dissolution of the insurrectionary army;
such a feat, however, is akin to the ‘withering away of the State’ and must be treated with the greatest
of suspicion. The insurrectionary model is therefore based on the recognition that destruction is a
necessary aspect to social transformation, but is limited only to this moment. Its opposite, the
evolutionary tendency, focuses instead only on the constructive moment of social change such that
its newly-created institutions, for the most part, are forced to work in accordance with hegemonic
practices. The evolutionary tendency does, however, emphasise the role of everyday life in the

16 Collectivism, advocated in some instances by Bakunin, involved the socialisation of the means of production under
the community/workers, but the retention of a monetarised economy to regulate the work and consumption.
Communism, advocated by Kropotkin, relied on non-monetarised regulation of work and consumption, such as
meetings, rosters, social and moral pressure, etc.
17 See Leval’s Collectives in the Spanish Revolution (1975) for detailed information on the rural anarchist experiments of
the Spanish Civil War.
reconstitution of power, that there is a need to change practices in the present and not ‘after the revolution’, and that social transformation requires the construction of alternative subjectivities against those presently in existence through contracting new relations. Anarcho-syndicalism, perhaps, integrates these destructive and constructive moments best, seeking to oppose existing relations of work, to build new subjectivities through everyday struggle, and to create new institutions through workplace preparation, training, and in the organisation of the CNT. Its crucial failing in respect to this discussion, however, is in its almost exclusive focus on workers. In Spain this included extensive valorisation of workers qua workers, an emphasis on a strong work ethic, and a privileging of the site of production. Other forms of domination were largely ignored, though the Mujeres Libres (free women) was set up during the war to tackle the extensive sexism in Spanish society at the time (Ackelsberg, 2005).

Post-Anarchist Considerations of Resistance

All three historical tendencies – anarcho-syndicalism, insurrectionary, and evolutionary – offer us lessons in this reconsideration of social transformation and, coupled with our earlier elaboration of post-anarchism, there are a number of aspects to resistance – or rather anarchist practice – that can be brought to light immediately. We see, in the first instance, a heightened emphasis on the terrain of everyday life, recognising that it is this stratum from which practices of domination are ontologically produced. Todd May warns that failure to recognise this aspect risks the reassertion of old modes of domination:

…the rise of current power relationships is traceable to specific local practices and must be understood on the basis of them. Failure to do so would lead – and has led – to the assumption that by destroying macropolitical entities and practices, the power arrangements reflected in those entities will themselves disappear (May, 1994: 99).

Resistance, therefore, must be focused on the stratum of everyday life as primary to changing both micro- and macro-political relations of domination. Secondly, we can observe that the destructive moment alone will not be enough. The post-anarchist political project clearly does not aim to simply capture the State for its own purposes, and nor can it rely on the autonomous and egalitarian impulses of the masses. Moreover, there is no ‘outside’ of power, no neutral absence of authority, but rather only different configurations of power. Resistance, therefore, must be accompanied by a substantial constructive moment, focused on creating new practices, and thus also new subjectivities in the understanding that means are ends. In many instances, then, construction of new practices will necessarily entail the erasure of others, combining both the insurrectionary and evolutionary models
or, in the words of Kropotkin, “in building we shall demolish” (Kropotkin, cited in Marshall, 1993: 317).18

We can also observe that practices produce effects that are non-linear, and therefore the creation of constructive projects must be viewed as experiments in social forms, with a readiness to abandon or radically change projects upon critical evaluation. Landauer writes, “we need attempts, we need the expedition of a thousand men to Sicily, we need these precious Garibaldi-natures and we need failures upon failures and the tough nature that is frightened by nothing” (cited in Day, 2005: 126). Indeed, experimentation is a recurring motif in the work of Foucault and Deleuze. Deleuze, for example, advises,

Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialisation, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of land at all times (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 178).

Moreover, the ability to radically alter such social experiments places constraints on their size, realising that in large experiments there is the risk that emergent assemblage properties will once again overtake their constituent parts. Day advises experiments occur among Deleuze’s ‘packs’, which have the properties of “small or restricted numbers, dispersion, […] impossibility of a fixed totalisation or hierarchisation” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 37), and that mass experiments be displaced for a mass of experiments, a multitude of “small-scale pack wanderings through infinite social spaces that are left unexplored” (Day, 2004: 176). The contemporary school of Italian insurrectionary theory thus emphasises that such experiments be socially reproducible. Experiments and tactics “require unsophisticated means that are available to all and easily reproducible, [which] are by their very simplicity and spontaneity uncontrollable” such that “the anonymous practice of social self-liberation could spread to all fields” (Anonymous, n.d.: 4).

An inchoate model such as this is a rejection of the strategic model of social change, as Todd May has argued, and instead an emphasis on tactics (May, 1994: 1-15). Strategic models, such as the classical Marxist and anarchist models assume an essentially linear operation of social forces which allow for the construction of grand strategies of social change.19 In assuming an essentially non-linear model where there is no central node of power, we are instead forced to abandon strategic models for tactical models, based around a multiplicity of initiatives and united only in the tendencies that

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18 This comment is indicative of a turn in Kropotkin’s thinking in the later years of his life, moving from the notion of the simple destruction of the State so as to realise the autonomous society below and rather to a new emphasis on construction (see Marshall, 1993: 309-338).
19 Indeed, such ideas persist: at a recent anarchist conference in New Zealand an attempt was made to apply Greenpeace’s campaigning model – which is essentially linear and ill-suited to anything but government lobbying – to the anarchist project in its totality. Needless to say, the ‘pathways to success’ that were developed were hopelessly simplistic.
they seek to extend. Murray Bookchin has elaborated further, claiming that “in contrast to the anarchist policy of continually pressing against the society in search of its weak-points and trying to open areas that would make revolutionary change possible, Marxian theory was structured around a strategy of ‘historical limits’ and ‘stages of development’” (Bookchin, 1989: 135). And in the work of Hakim Bey we see a similar insistence: “we concentrate our force on temporary ‘power surges’, avoiding all entanglements with ‘permanent solutions’” (Bey, 2003: 101). That power is everywhere, and that strategic avenues of change are inappropriate, is not, however, to suggest a blind flurry of opposition. While Bookchin suggests a search for “weak-points”, May suggests, in addition, a search for its strongest points, that is, those lines of power which are reinforcing, which “vibrate” across larger regions of social networks, coming to strengthen asymmetric relations (May, 1994: 54). A tactical approach, therefore, suggests both the exploitation of the multiplicity of weak points and the opposition to specific relations that have widespread ramifications. These lines cannot be presumed, however, but must be discovered through intervention (May, 1994: 53).

There are indeed tactics that are already extant within the contemporary anarchist milieu, which palpate and exploit the weak points and oppose the strong, but they are numerous such that an evaluation here cannot be exhaustive. Instead, I want to focus on a three broad examples that are indicative of this change in orientation: the exodus, non-violent direct action, and the creation of autonomous zones. An increasingly popular tactic that is part of the destructive moment of social transformation has been the Autonomist notion of the ‘exodus’ (Day, 2005: 210), also known as the ‘refusal to work’ (Black, 1991), ‘tactics of disappearance’ (Bey, 2003: 126), or simply ‘dropping out’ (crimethInc, 2006: 10). As the crimethInc journal Rolling Thunder argues:

The system runs on the blood and sweat of our hijacked lives; the more we invest ourselves in surviving according to its terms, the more difficult it is to do otherwise. Seizing back time and energy from its jaws is the essence of and the precondition for any real resistance. The paralyzing commonsense notion that everyone, even the most radical of the radical, plays a role in the status quo hides the subversive possibility that all of us – even radicals – can refuse our roles (crimethInc, 2006).

The author goes on to ask, “how can we change society without deserting the ranks of those who maintain it?” (crimethInc, 2006: 13). Exodus is this notion of desertion. It is a recognition that it is through our everyday practices that relations of domination are produced, and it is a refusal, to the extent that is possible, to contribute further. Moreover, contrary to the strict Autonomist notion, exodus is more than a refusal to work, it is rather a refusal to engage in practices that constitute relations of domination in their totality. In the same Rolling Thunder journal, therefore, we see an article on the notion of a ‘gender dropout’:

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20 Such lines could come to resemble Althusser’s ideological and repressive State apparatus, such that resistance/creation at the sites of the family, the school, the workplace, the media, and in relation to the police, may well have effects disproportionate to the initial force.
The gender system (which is wedded to sex) as I have experienced it is in no way consensual, and it contains some seriously fucked up power dynamics. *What perpetuates this system is only us, and only our daily interactions. [...] As we become de-construction workers, we make revolution – a gender evolution. (cimuthInc, 2006: 24; emphasis added).

To be clear, this is not a simple inversion of existing categories, whether a valorisation of unemployment, a reversing of gender roles, or an insistence on deviant sexualities. To this latter aspect, for example, Judith Butler writes, “the affirmation of homosexuality is itself an extension of a homophobic discourse” (Butler, cited in Day, 2005: 88). Exodus is not a wholesale rejection of existing norms, seeking salvation merely in transgression, but instead a critical engagement with existing practices and the desertion of those deemed to constitute relations of domination.21 Individually such tactics are unlikely to have much effect, except to open up alternative spaces (which we shall cover shortly), but in line with contemporary insurrectionary anarchism the aim of such a tactic is its spread throughout the social terrain, to be a ‘general strike’ akin to that imagined by the anarcho-syndicalists, only more expansive in its refusal extending beyond the site of work.

**Sabotage** of specific, central aspects of the material world, as well disruption of key practices, form another tactic that is primarily of the destructive moment; both form the generic tactic known as ‘non-violent direct action’.22 Tactics of sabotage have been deployed extensively in the radical ecological movement, to lesser extent in anti-militarist activity, and lesser still in workplace struggles. The radical ecological movement, oftentimes going under the generic ‘Earth Liberation Front’ banner, has, for example, destroyed mining equipment, burnt large construction projects encroaching on wilderness areas and dug up access roads to sites of ecological devastation. In anti-militarist struggle there has been destruction of military equipment such as tanks and jets stationed on military bases, and in workplace struggles there has been low-level sabotage of workplaces, especially during strikes. It is realised that each instance of sabotage is not enough in itself, but as part of a campaign of many such acts the aim is to cripple specific projects, or else cost them such that further efforts become unprofitable, an idea summed up in the common slogan ‘hit them where it hurts – direct action gets the goods’. Disruption forms the second, more popular, form of non-violent direct action.

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21 Saul Newman uses Derrida in making a similar argument, claiming that the transgressive is the other to the norm, and the embrace of the latter only reinforces its relational other. Newman advises, instead, the creation of a new terrain (2001: 121).

22 It is a widely held ethic of the anarchist, activist and radical milieus that violence and property destruction are separate. Violence, deemed as hurt against people, is for the most part avoided except in exceptional circumstances and potentially in self-defence, while damage against the property of the State or Capital, for example, is largely endorsed. As David Graeber has written: “...governments simply do not know how to deal with an overtly revolutionary movement that refuses to fall into familiar patterns of armed resistance. The effort to destroy existing paradigms is usually quite self-conscious. Where once it seemed that the only alternatives to marching along with signs were either Ghandian non-violent civil-disobedience or outright insurrection, groups like [...] Black Blocs [...] have] been trying to map out a completely new territory in between. [...] What can only be called non-violent warfare [...] in the sense that it eschews any direct physical harm to human beings” (Graeber, 2002: 66).
The specific instances of disruption are numerous, and include occupations of mining sites or military bases, large gatherings on central motorways – known as ‘Reclaim the Streets’ – and the paralysis of major cities, ‘lock-ons’ where people use custom-made arm-tubes or bike locks to secure themselves to crucial sites, and human blockades. Large-scale ‘shutdowns’ of the summits of the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank have been successful in deploying these tactics of disruption, and coordinating thousands of people through consensus organising and other horizontal organising methods, such as ‘spokescouncils’. These tactics of non-violent direct action aim to impede everyday practices deemed objectionable, to attack the specific localised instances of oppression in the realisation that there is no centre, and are of a nature that these resistant practices can be taken up by others. It is, as Richard Day has claimed, a ‘non-branded’ tactic, one that is taken up by a multitude of groups without overarching command, which “spread[s] in a viral way, with no one taking ownership or attempting to exercise control over how it is implemented” (Day, 2005: 19).

In both these tactics – dropping out, and moments of direct action – there is a latent constructive moment. Dropping out necessarily requires new relations to be established – with one another, and with the material world – so as to survive. Squatting, urban camping, pirate communes, urban/community gardens, shoplifting and ‘dumpster-diving’ are all widely practised. In addition, large-scale disruptive actions – Reclaim the Streets, paralysing cities, blockades, protest camps/occupations – also involve the creation of new situations, new relations, and new practices. Indeed, many have written of the transformative power of merely participating in such actions – successful or otherwise – and in this sense these destructive moments work to destabilise and create new subjectivities. Karen Goaman, for example, has drawn on the Russian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin and his notion of the ‘carnival’ to describe a number of large anarchist protests, wherein conditions are created that “offers the experience of utopian freedom, community and equality”, and where “the familiar is defamiliarised” (Goaman, 2004: 170-171). The anarchist writer Hakim Bey has also written on what he terms the ‘temporary autonomous zones’ that are created in these moments of resistance and, drawing explicitly from Deleuze and Guattari, he has celebrated them for their power to induce a form of “psychic nomadism” (Bey, 2003: 104). Moreover, there are similarities in these conceptions to the anarcho-syndicalist tendency and its emphasis on the transformation of workers through struggle, and similarly in the 1960s Situationist International’s practice of creating ‘situations’

23 For a collation of responses to, and descriptions of, the tactics and events of the 2001 protests in Genoa against the ‘Group of Eight’, see On Fire: The battle of Genoa (2001). Numerous articles, written by participants, delve into the unique organizational forms adopted during the protest.
24 My own personal experiences are certainly testament to this transformative effect. The 2006 weapons conference protests in Wellington saw more than 300 protesters rout the approximately 60 police, successfully blockading the conference venue, Te Papa, and also creating a ‘liberated territory’, as it were, where police did not dare tread for fear of provoking outright riot. The feeling was immensely empowering, inspiring for the cooperative and egalitarian order that was achieved among protesters, and tempered only by the police arrests the next day.
defined as “a moment of life, concretely and deliberately constructed by the collective organization of unitary environment and the free play of events” (Situationist International, 1958).

More substantially constructive again are the tactics varyingly referred to as permanent or semi-permanent autonomous zones (PAZ/SPAZ), social centres, and ‘pirate communes’. The previous tactics are characterised by post-anarchism’s emphasis on prefiguration, but it is in the creation of autonomous zones that prefiguration reaches its zenith. As Richard Day writes, autonomous zones, in spite of their limits, “provide an island of achieved social change, a place where the revolution has actually happened, if only for a few, if only for a short time” (Day, 2005: 163). Clearly, this is a rejection of the classical anarchist notion of power that provided no escape from the apparatus of the State so long as it imposed its order upon society, where its efficacy was total. Rather, the creation of autonomous zones embraces the notion of power as decentred, which has as its underside the insistence that, no matter how totalising a system might be it can never achieve its ambition – there will always be holes, margins and fissures. This tactic is a reclamation of space and time – and in this sense autonomous zones are destructive, containing an element of the insurrectionary model – and simultaneously they are the creation of alternative relations, and thus alternative subjectivities. The contemporary Italian insurrectionary school writes,

> Only by upsetting the imperatives of time and social space will it be possible to imagine new relations and surroundings. The old philosopher said one can only desire on the basis of what one knows. Desires can only change if one changes the life that produces them. Let’s be clear about this: rebellion against the organisation of time and space is a material and psychological necessity (Anonymous, c.1985).

The notion of autonomous spaces has been most widely practised in Italy in their ‘social centre’ movement which emerged during the 1970s. In the early years of that decade the Italian revolutionary left had been forming ‘comitati di quartiere’, or neighbourhood councils, to complement the workers’ councils that had already developed. In Milan the first social centre was established, known as the Leoncavallo centre, through the occupation of an abandoned building and was consequently used for the community provision of a library, a medical clinic and a pre-school. It became a loci of the radical community: anarchists set up a printing press, theatre groups operated out of it, and a women’s-only space was created (Day, 2005: 40). The social centre movement quickly spread across Italy in spite of government repression and a number of assassinations by the far right, and the model has also been adopted internationally. As with all experiments, however, the risk of new practices of domination emerging must be constantly guarded against. Some recent commentators have criticised the reduced militancy of the movement of recent times, and that the social centres have been coopted and “are integrated into metropolitan society of the spectacle […] in a certain way they function as a business, internally they are like a cooperative that organises shows
and offers them to the public for a certain price in order to finance themselves” (Anonymous interview, cited in Day, 2005: 41). A similar creation of autonomous spaces occurred following the Argentinean economic crisis in 2001, where a number of the resulting unemployed coordinated across the country and came to form a movement known as the ‘piqueteros’. In addition to the widespread blockading of motorways in protest at their poverty, the movement – which was decentralised, and horizontally federated – formed neighbourhood assemblies, community bakeries, gardens, clinics and water purification centres in what were previously shantytowns, and have supported the occupation and expropriation of a number of workplaces (Day, 2005: 42). The aim in the creation of such autonomous spaces as a tactic of revolutionary change must be the experimentation and full development of practices concomitant with an ethics of freedom, and simultaneously an attempt so as to spread the tactic throughout the wider social terrain.

The contemporary insurrectionary tradition is based heavily around the notion of ‘social war’. They stress, however, that this is not war as traditionally conceived: “The force of insurrection is social, not military. […] No role [ie. the guerrilla], no matter how much it puts one at risk in terms of the law, can take the place of the real changing of relations. There is no short cut, no immediate leap into the elsewhere. The revolution is not a [traditional] war” (Anonymous, c.1985). Rather, it is an everyday practice, combining the destructive and constructive moments, engaging in numerous and multifarious tactics, experimenting and rebelling. In this sense, the social war is a break from the notion of State peace and instead, in accordance with a Stirnerite and Nietzschean conception of social relations as force, it is a constant battle against certain relations and the creation of others.

What this constructive moment looks like will inevitably differ from person to person, and from community to community; indeed it must! There are some final comments, however, worth making in light of recent ecological developments. While classical anarchism, much like classical Marxism, revelled in the notion of progress, in technological development, and a ‘post-scarcity’ future, there has been a growing trend on the radical left towards a kind of primitivism, one that, in the least, envisions a radically new form of industrialism and, more often, a non-industrial society. Critiques such as these have been advanced by Jacques Camatte and Fredy Perlman during the 1980s, and were originally based around the effects industrialism had for social organisation, ranging from imposing a strict division of labour, imposing technical and often political hierarchies, and imposing forms of mass society that limited personal and community autonomy (Millet, 2004: 90). More recent critiques have, in addition, focused on the effects of global warming, peak oil and topsoil depletion – all of which threaten to impose a radically reduced form of industrialism irrespective of human endeavour. Such non-industrial visions necessarily impact upon tactics that incorporate a significant constructive moment. An interview with the editors of a North American anarchist journal A Murder of Crows, for example, writes:
You’ve got to think that cities, towns, suburbs, etc. are a product of specific relations; therefore if we’re talking about total transformation, our living spaces are going to require complete transformation as well (A Murder of Crows, 2007).

The transformation of social relations, therefore, necessarily entails a transformation of the material world, including such foundational aspects as the separation of rural and urban space, and attempts towards the realisation of such visions must find their way into the constructive moments of anarchist practice.

*Tactics*, rather than *strategy*, thus becomes the preoccupation of post-anarchism. Exodus, direct action, and the establishment of ‘autonomous’ areas collectively seek to extend those tendencies consonant with practices of freedom, and to fight against and withdraw from those deemed constituting of relations of domination, of asymmetric power relations. This ‘social war’ seeks to create and extend fissures of space and time, and open them up as spaces of becoming-minor, of constant and critical experimentation, so as to radically change sedimented practices, subjectivities and the material organisation of our world. A *mass of experiments*, as opposed to mass experiments, and the decentralised and viral spread of such techniques is sought rather than the centralised or directed forms of resistance of classical emancipatory theories.  

Despite well founded tactics, however, it is worth noting that many contemporary anarchists are modest in the effect they believe they can have given their numbers: “…we are not going to be the main catalyst for getting people to be more conflictual. […] The part anarchists can play in those [unpredictable breaks in the status quo] is to push the those ruptures further by intervening in the conflict in a way that promotes, through action and ideas, autonomy, direct action, and the rejection of the political process completely” (A Murder of Crows, 2007).
IV. Conclusion

THE COLLAPSE OF THE UTOPIAN PROJECT in the post-World War Two era is widely accepted as a given, as if those that previously fought for the total reorganisation of society had finally given themselves to the lesser task of the more rational and humane management of the status quo (social democracy, the third way, etc.). The failure to see the continuation of a utopian project, or rather a multitude of such projects, is due precisely to a shift in the very conception of revolution and utopia. The very real and substantive difference between Marxism and classical anarchism over the question of the State and power masked the fact that both were really quite similar – as products of Enlightenment thinking – in their foundational assumptions. These assumptions, the a priori that haunts classical anarchism, can be reduced to two key aspects: firstly, a notion of power as transcendent to the social body and originating in the singularity of the State, working in a simple top-down fashion upon the otherwise autonomous organisation of society; secondly, a humanism that posited a human essence that was essentially freedom-desiring, cooperative, that tended towards egalitarian relations and which was suppressed under the ’yoke’ of the State. Upon these assumptions were built the familiar utopian project. Freedom, the aim of the classical anarchist project, was conceived unproblematically as the absence of power, in which conditions the natural cooperative tendencies of humanity could be unleashed so as to realise, once and for all, the revolutionary society. Revolution, therefore, was the destruction of the State – a cataclysmic rupture and qualitative change with previous social organisation – and was to be conducted by the revolutionary subject embodied in that broad mass in whom lay the seeds of change and are collectively known as the ’oppressed’. A utopian project conceived such as this – Marxist or anarchist – has indeed largely subsided in the post-World War Two era. But the utopian impulse has not died; rather, it has been eclipsed by a project that bears little superficial resemblance. The singular and totalising conception of revolutionary change of the classical emancipatory theories, the notion of becoming-major to use Deleuze’s formulation, has instead been replaced with a dispersed, decentralised and viral becoming-minor of contemporary, second-wave anarchism.

Post-anarchism is a systematic attempt to build an anarchism without the a priori faults of its predecessor, to further deepen the tendencies of contemporary – as opposed to classical – anarchism, and to commit itself to an understanding of the social founded upon an ontology of immanence. In the first instance, power is conceived as decentralised and exercised from innumerable points, as immanent and necessary to all interactions, and as constitutive of larger relations of domination. This latter aspect forms the basis for Deleuze’s separation of micro- and macro-politics. These domains don’t correlate simply to the State and society, and nor are they fixed to any particular strata, but
rather describe the processes whereby emergent strata are ontologically produced from the complex and non-linear interactions – the micro-politics – of the strata below. Power, therefore, is for the most part bottom-up, where macro-assemblages and large-scale relations of domination are produced in the micro-politics of everyday life. While macro-politics remains important (it is not one or the other, as Deleuze insists, but ‘and, and, and…’), the micro is primary. Moreover, fundamental changes in social relations necessitate a total transformation in the relations of everyday life or else risk, as Foucault warned, simply a reconstitution of the politics of old. This is a non-functionalist conception of macro-politics, where the historical construction of macro-assemblages is not teleological, but arises through the capillary and contingent spread of certain techniques at the expense of others. Crucially, in regards to this discussion, freedom is conceived not as an absence of power but rather a specific organisation of power, one that avoids the asymmetric and frozen relations that characterise conditions of domination, and which seeks the free flowing exercise of power distributed throughout the social terrain. This is not a static state, but instead a becoming, a practice, an ‘ongoing actuality’. In the second instance, post-anarchism views the subject not as transcendent to the forces that act upon the body but as produced by them, as an effect. The ‘oppressed masses’ cease to occupy a pure space of resistance and come instead wholly complicit and produced by the everyday practices of which they are part. The revolutionary subject of post-anarchism, therefore, cannot be founded upon an existing social category that is produced out of relations of domination; its aim, in fact, is for the eventual abolition of those very categories. The revolutionary subject must instead be an orientation, an inclination towards permanent revolt against practices of domination and a tendency towards social experimentation and reorganisation of power relations, aiming always to further maximise conditions of freedom. In a similar vein, the notion of revolution is transformed. Social change must be approached in a fashion concomitant with the operations of power. Cataclysmic, qualitative change is replaced with widespread change in degree, and utopian finality is replaced with an open-ended conception of revolution, as a process never fully realised.

A radical new underpinning such as this necessarily entails a shift in practice, in the conceptions of social change. The classical anarchist project contained within itself three tendencies of resistance: the insurrectionary tendency, the evolutionary tendency, and anarcho-syndicalism. The first was heavily rooted in classical anarchism, representing a purely destructive moment and relying on the egalitarian impulses of the masses. The second, the evolutionary tendency, was its opposite and focused entirely on the constructive moment in the creation of alternative institutions, but in lacking a destructive aspect and often choosing institutional legality, the evolutionary tendency was limited and risked full integration into hegemonic practices. Of the three, anarcho-syndicalism was the most developed, aptly integrating both the destructive and constructive moments, but it was
limited by its focus on simply on the condition of work. In addition to an insistence on both the destructive and constructive moments to anarchist practice, and in its opposition to the totality of relations that constitute domination, the post-anarchist project brings a number of insights from its revised view of the social. The politics and transformation of everyday life becomes an essential aspect, both in the reconstitution of macro-political assemblages and equally in the creation of new subjectivities. These transformations must be treated as experiments, and must be conducted not *en masse* as a singular project, but rather as a multiplicity of small-scale projects, each designed with the aim for their reproduction and spread across the social terrain. Moreover, this is a tactical model of change. In opposition to a singular strategy, a multiplicity of tactics works in accordance with the decentred, bottom-up, and non-linear nature of power, constantly pressing against various practices, transforming some, and creating other relations anew. Contemporary anarchist practices offer many such examples of possible tactics, including the notion of exodus, direct action, and the creation of autonomous spaces. In all, the aim is a prefigurative politics: withdrawing ourselves from practices deemed antithetical to relations of freedom, similarly fighting against and disrupting those of which we are not a part, and seeking out fissures of time and space so as to create new relations with one another and with our material world. This notion of social war, of revolutionary practice without end, is one that seeks not the conquest of power but rather a generalised revolt and the viral adoption of these tactics throughout the social terrain, opening and creating spaces of *becoming-minor*.

The central question with which we started – ‘What is to be done?’ – remains perhaps only partially answered. Indeed, more concrete answers lie in the substantial and expansive practical work in implementing and experimenting with the multiplicity of tactics and relations that are available in pursuing freedom as an ongoing actuality. Nevertheless, the criticisms of the ‘spectacles of resistance’ made of the anti-globalisation movement ring even stronger in this evaluation. The large anti-summit protests, at least by themselves, make for a weak tactic precisely because they maintain the notion that there exist centres of power to global capitalism, whether in the Group of Eight, the World Trade Organisation, or otherwise. Indeed, in many ways they marked a return to the insurrectionary model with all of its faults. It appears, in fact, that since the decline of the anti-globalisation movement it is to the alternative praxis advocated here that many have turned, and perhaps there is in that some hope.
References

*Modesto Anarcho*, 3.


